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WooCommerce Security Audit Checklist: What I Checked on a Live Store

By Shakh Farid·November 18, 2026·0 views
#WordPress Security#WooCommerce#Security Audit#Wordfence#Cloudflare#WP-CLI

Short answer: A useful WooCommerce security audit has five parts: check what the public can reach, verify that core, plugin and theme files are untouched, review users and settings, update or remove plugins, and harden the layer in front (SSL, TLS, firewall). On a live stationery store this found one serious issue (backup files in the public folder) and a handful of smaller ones, all fixed in an afternoon without downtime.

Why this audit happened

The store's owner was tired. In a short time the shop had been suspended by its host for CPU overuse, moved to a new host, and rebuilt without a page builder. Before telling the owner everything was fine, I wanted proof, not a feeling. So I ran a full audit on the live site, over SSH with WP-CLI and from outside with curl.

Part 1: What can the public reach?

Start where an attacker starts. I requested a list of sensitive paths and compared the response with what it should be:

RequestExpectedWhy
/wp-login.php, /wp-admin/404 or redirectLogin moved to a custom URL
/xmlrpc.php403Common brute-force target
/wp-json/wp/v2/users401Stops username listing
/?author=1404Stops username listing
/wp-content/uploads/403No directory listing
/.env, /.git/config, wp-config.php.bak403 or 404Secrets and source code
/debug.log, /wp-content/debug.log403 or 404Logs leak paths and errors
/readme.html404Reveals the WordPress version
Backup names: public_html.zip, backup.zip, *.sql.gz404Full site and database

Everything matched, except two backup files that returned 200. They were the leftover migration archive and database dump. I moved them out of the web folder and purged them from Cloudflare's cache (full write-up).

Also look at the response headers. A server or x-powered-by header that names exact software versions gives attackers a head start.

Part 2: Are the files what they should be?

Malware usually hides by changing existing files or adding new PHP files where nobody looks.

WordPress core:

wp core verify-checksums

It compares every core file with the official checksums. The only difference was a missing readme.html, removed on purpose.

Plugins from WordPress.org:

wp plugin verify-checksums --all

Eighteen plugins verified. The only extra files were storage files a backup plugin creates for itself. Premium plugins can't be checked this way, because WordPress.org doesn't have their checksums.

The custom theme: I compared an MD5 hash of each theme file on the server with the source files. One file was an older version, missing two security fixes, so I redeployed it (how that happened).

PHP where it shouldn't be:

find wp-content/uploads -type f \( -iname "*.php*" -o -iname "*.phtml" -o -iname "*.phar" \) ! -name index.php

The uploads folder should hold images and documents, not code. The only hit was a debug log file from a long-removed plugin, already blocked from the web.

Obvious backdoor patterns in the theme and root files: eval(base64_decode(, gzinflate, str_rot13, assert($_ and preg_replace with the /e modifier. Nothing found.

Part 3: Users and settings

  • Administrators: only one admin account, which belongs to the owner. Every extra admin is another password to steal.
  • Registration: "Anyone can register" off, default role Subscriber. Customer accounts come from checkout only.
  • WP_DEBUG: off on the live site, so errors aren't printed to visitors.
  • File editing: DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT was not set. I added it to wp-config.php, which removes the theme and plugin code editors from wp-admin. If an admin password is ever stolen, the attacker can't paste PHP into the theme from the dashboard.
  • Version hiding: the WordPress generator tag is removed from the page source.
  • Input handling in custom code: custom AJAX handlers clean every value with WordPress and WooCommerce functions (sanitize_title(), wc_clean(), wp_unslash()) before using it.
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Part 4: Updates and unused plugins

Outdated plugins are the most common way WordPress sites get hacked.

  • Four active plugins had updates: WooCommerce, Yoast SEO, Advanced Custom Fields and a chat widget. I took a database backup first, then updated one at a time, loading the shop after each update so a problem would point to a single plugin. All four went through cleanly.
  • Three plugins weren't needed anymore: a migration plugin and the old page builder with its add-on. Inactive plugins still sit on the server, and their code can still be reached directly if it has a vulnerability. I kept a copy of the one that isn't available on WordPress.org, then deleted all three.

Part 5: The layer in front

Cloudflare:

  • SSL mode changed from Full to Full (strict), so Cloudflare only talks to the server over a valid certificate.
  • Minimum TLS version raised from 1.0 to 1.2.
  • Always Use HTTPS and Bot Fight Mode on.

Wordfence:

  • firewall on, scheduled scans running and completing;
  • IP detection set to Cloudflare's CF-Connecting-IP header, so lockouts hit the attacker, not Cloudflare;
  • low-resource scanning on, which suits shared hosting.

More on the Cloudflare side in the Cloudflare setup guide for WooCommerce.

What's left for the owner

Two things should be done by the owner personally:

  1. Change the admin password, since a database dump had been publicly reachable for a short time.
  2. Turn on two-factor authentication in Wordfence's Login Security. It's the single biggest protection for an admin account.

HSTS in Cloudflare is the next step once every subdomain is confirmed on HTTPS.

The checklist

Outside

  • login, xmlrpc, user listing and directory listing blocked
  • no backups, logs, .env, .git or wp-config copies reachable
  • no version numbers in headers or page source

Files

  • wp core verify-checksums passes
  • wp plugin verify-checksums --all passes
  • custom theme matches your source
  • no PHP files in uploads; no backdoor patterns

Users and config

  • minimum number of admins; registration off unless needed
  • WP_DEBUG off, DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT on
  • custom code sanitizes input

Plugins

  • everything updated (backup first, one at a time)
  • unused plugins deleted, not just deactivated

Front layer

  • SSL Full (strict), TLS 1.2 minimum, HTTPS forced
  • firewall on and reading the real visitor IP
  • 2FA for every admin

FAQ

How do I check if my WordPress site has been hacked?

Run wp core verify-checksums and wp plugin verify-checksums --all, look for PHP files in the uploads folder, search theme files for obfuscated code like eval(base64_decode(, and check for admin users you don't recognise. A security plugin scan adds a second opinion.

Should I delete inactive WordPress plugins?

Yes. Inactive plugin files are still on the server and can still be exploited if they have a vulnerability. Delete what you don't use.

What does DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT do?

It removes the built-in theme and plugin code editors from wp-admin. Someone who gets into an admin account can't edit PHP files from the dashboard.

How often should I audit a WooCommerce store?

Do a full audit after any migration, restore, major rebuild or security incident, and a lighter check (updates, users, outside requests) every month.


This is the audit I ran on a live Bangladeshi stationery e-commerce store after its migration. Want the same check on your WooCommerce site? Contact me through my web development service.

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Shakh Farid

Written by

Shakh Farid

Founder, Zass Tech

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